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RECENT CASES

STAFF

ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

Al/red Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96 S.Ct. 1854 (1976).
This appeal stems from several related actions which arose out of the
Cuban government's seizure, or "intervention", of a number of cigar
companies owned by Cuban nationals. The complex chain of litigation
began when the former owners of five companies sued three American
importers to recover the purchase price owed for cigars shipped from the
seized companies, and for trademark infringement. The Cuban government, and the agents it had named to operate the companies (the "interventors"), then sought to enjoin the attorneys representing the former
owners from pursuing their actions against the importers. The District
Court, in F. Palicio y Compaia, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), a/rd, 375 F. 2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 830 (1967), found the seizure an "act of state", and held the interventors were entitled to pursue their claims for the money owed for
cigars shipped after the intervention, and that the former owners were
not. Since the confiscation by Cuba was of property of its own nationals,
the act was not in violation of international law, even though the takings
were uncompensated. Thus the Hickenlooper Amendment did not bar
application of the act of state doctrine.
After Palicio was decided, it was discovered that subsequent to the
date of intervention, the importers had paid a considerable sum of money
to Cuba for cigars shipped before the date of seizure. This new claim,
adjudicated as a counter-claim to the interventors' claim to the postintervention payments, would culminate in the Dunhill decision. The
District Court, in Menindez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp.
527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), first, following the Palicio decision, gave judgment
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in favor of the interventors. The court then held the act of state doctrine did not bar the former owners' claim to the payments mistakenly
made to the interventors for the pre-intervention shipments. The situs of
the accounts receiveable was in the United States with the debtors, so the
doctrine would not apply to protect an attempted seizure of debts owed
by persons outside that state's territory when the seizure was without
compensation, and thus inconsistent with the laws and policy of the
United States. Finally, the court ruled the importers were entitled to set
off the mistaken payments against the amounts the importers owed the
interventors for the post-intervention shipments. One of the importers,
Dunhill, was awarded an affirmative judgement, as it was entitled to
reimbursement in excess of what it owed the interventors.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, but only allowed Dunhill's
counter-claim up to the limit of its debt to the interventors. Menindez v.
Saks and Company, 485 F. 2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973). The interventors had
refused to repay Dunhill. The court agreed with their counsel's claim
that this refusal was an act of state to which the United States courts
must give deference, as the court found the situs of the obligation to repay
was in Cuba. But the court also ruled that the act of state doctrine did
not bar the counter-claim, up to the amount sought by the interventors,
following First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S.
759 (1972). Dunhill appealed.
The Supreme. Court reversed, and found for Dunhill. Four justices
found that the interventors had not met their burden of proving an act
of state. Counsel for the interventors had argued that Cuba denied liability and refused repayment, but the plurality reasoned that this refusal
was merely a litigating position: that the interventors had failed to prove
some statute, decree, order or resolution of the Cuban government indicating a repudiation of its obligations; alternatively the Justices found
the refusal was only a reiteration of the original claim to the pre-intervention accounts.
Justice White, writing for three judges, went on to propose a blanket
"commercial obligations" exception to the doctrine. The Justice reasoned
that the foreign policy bases for the courts' recognition of and deference
to a foreign government's acts of state do not exist when those acts are
merely a repudiation of obligations by a government engaged in the
international commercial marketplace. He found that the United States had
adopted the "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity in suits arising
out of..a foreign government's commercial activities, and concluded that,
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given this national policy, the courts were not required to recognize a
foreign government's repudiation of its purely commercial obligations.
Justice Stevens concurred only in finding no act of state, and refused to join in the "commercial obligations" exception proposed by the
three Justices. Justice Powell concurred separately, noting that the line
between political and commercial acts would often be difficult to delineate, but refrained from deciding whether or not this was an act of
state. He instead repeated his position in the First National City Bank
decision, indicating that Dunhill is not a case where adjudication would
interfere with delicate foreign relations conducted by the political
branches.
The four dissenting Justices argued that not only was the refusal an
"act of state", but that it was an integral part of the expropriation of
the cigar companies, an act which was clearly within the doctrine. The
dissent argued that the refusal by itself, even without the issuance of a
formal decree, constituted the exercise of sovereign power to which the
United States courts must defer. Justice Marshall, writing for the dissenters, disagreed with the plurality's analogy to sovereign immunity because an act of state encompasses different policies, and because such an
approach might lead to the Court passing on "political questions" which
the Constitution reserves to the political branches.

STATE TAXATION OF FOREIGN COMMERCE
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 96 S.Ct. 535 (1976)
Petitioner brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief to
enjoin the State of Georgia from assessing a non-discriminatory ad valorem property tax on its inventory of imported tires maintained at its
wholesale distribution warehouse located within the state. Petitioner alleged that the tax violated the Import-Export Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I,
§ 10, cl. 2, which prohibits the laying by the states of " . . . any Imports or Duties on Imports . ...
The Superior Court of Georgia granted Petitioner the requested
relief. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in
part, holding that the tires were not immune from the nondiscriminatory
ad valorem property tax because they had lost their status as imports.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the
Georgia Supreme Court's decision and overruled its previous decision in
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Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871). The U.S. Supreme Court
held that a non-discriminatory ad valorem property tax assessed against
the imported tires was not within the constitutional prohibition of the
Import-Export Clause. The Court did not address the question of whether
the tires had lost their status as imports. Rather, the decision was based
on the Court's conclusion that a non-discriminatory ad valorem property
tax is not the type of state exaction which the Framers of the Constitution
had in mind as being an "impost" or "duty."
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, reasoned the Framers of
the Constitution, in committing the sole power to the Federal Government
to lay imposts and duties on imports, had three main concerns. First, there
must be one authority when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments. Second, import revenues should not be diverted to the
states. And third, states should be prohibited from taxing goods merely
flowing through their ports and thus levying taxes on citizens of other
states.
In view of these concerns, the Court observed that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax is not objectionable. Since the tax does not
fall on imports because of their place of origin it cannot be applied
selectively to encourage or discourage an importation inconsistent with
federal regulation. Furthermore, such taxes, which are not levied upon
the commercial privilege of bringing goods into the country, do not deprive the federal government of any revenues to which it is entitled.
The taxes only cover the cost of the state in providing services in the
handling of the goods. Finally, the taxes do not interfere with the free
flow of imported goods among the states. They can easily be avoided
through the use of modern transportation and the assessment of such
taxes as transit fees can be averted by prohibiting assessment on goods
that are still in transit as imports.
This last concern did not pose a problem in the instant case. Petitioner's tires were no longer in transit. They were stored in a warehouse
"operated no differently that would be a distribution warehouse utilized
by a wholesaler dealing solely in domestic goods. .... .
ALIENS
IN RE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS. U.S. v. Field, 532 F.2d 404
(5th Cir. 1976)
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Appellant, a Canadian citizen residing in the Cayman Islands, employed
as the managing director of Castle Bank and Trust Company Ltd. (Cayman), refused to testify before a federal grand jury investigating possible tax law violations relating to the use of foreign banks to evade tax
enforcement. A contempt citation was issued for his refusal to answer
grand jury questions pursuant to a subpoena served on him while present
in the United States and he appealed.
Appellant contended that requiring him to testify violated his Fifth
Amendment rights against self-incrimination since the act of testifying
would violate the bank secrecy laws of the Cayman Islands. He also maintained that the courts should refuse to enforce the subpoena as -a matter
of international comity arguing that nations should make every effort
to avoid the situation presented where one nation requires an act that
the other nation makes illegal.
In affirming the contempt citation, the court rejected appellant's
contentions stating that the Fifth Amendment is not applicable when a
foreign state makes the act of testifying a criminal offense. In balancing
the interests of the Cayman Islands in protecting the right of privacy
incorporated in its bank secrecy laws with the United States' interest in
obtaining information concerning violation of its tax laws, the court
found substantial reason to enforce the subpoena. Failure to enforce the
subpoena would significantly restrict the ability of the grand jury to
obtain information which might possibly uncover criminal activities of
the most serious nature. The traditional discretion given the grand jury
and the significant national interest in tax enforcement outweigh the
conflicting interests of appellant and the Cayman Islands.
ALIENS
Vardy v. United States, 529 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976)
Petitioner, an alien permanently residing in the United States, appealed the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which
was collaterally involved with his extradition to Canada to stand trial
for his activities as a Canadian government official prior to his emigration
to Florida.
Petitioner, having been arrested in Panama at the request of the
Canadian government, flew into Miami in the custody of the Panamanian
police. When he arrived in Miami his attorney had arranged for a U.S.
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Marshal to take him into custody pursuant to a petition for habeas
corpus in order to interrupt his transfer from Panama to Canada. While
the petitioner was in the custody of U.S. officials, Canadian extradition
proceedings were begun under a treaty between the United States and
Canada providing for the return to Canada of persons "found" in the
United States. At the time of this appeal the extradition proceeding was
still pending with no determination of extraditability having been made.
Defendant's argument centered around the fact that his presence in
the United States was not voluntary and thus he could not be "found"
in the United States for purposes of the United States-Canadian extradition treaty. The court, mindful of the rule that extradition treaties should
be construed liberally, found no difficulty in concluding that the defendant was "found" in the United States for purposes of the extradition
treaty: "Vardy makes his home in Florida and enjoys the benefits which
accrue to an alien who possesses a card designating him as a permanent
resident of the United States. The immediate cause for his physical
presence in the United States at the time the extradition proceeding began was his own initiative in employing the federal courts to interrupt
the continuity of his transfer from Panama to Canada. No official of the
federal government, other than the U.S. Marshal acting on behalf of
Vardy's attorney, had anything to do with arranging his trip from Panama to Canada or with prolonging his stay in Miami. Regardless of the
legality of morality of the actions of the Canadian or Panamanian governments, Vardy was 'found' in the United States on the afternoon of
January 25, 1974, and at all material times thereafter."
The dismissal of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was affirmed.
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SERVICE OF PROCESS
United States v. Danenza, 528 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1975)
Defendant, an American citizen residing in Milan, Italy, appealed an
order holding him in civil contempt of court for failure to comply with
a grand jury subpoena, issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1783 (1970). The
subpoena was delivered by the United States Consulate in Milan to the
"appropriate" Italian authorities. The Italian authorities attempted
to
personally serve Defendant. Failing this, the subpoena was delivered to
the concierge at Defendant's residence in accordance with the Italian
service of process laws (Article 139 of the Italian Civil Procedure Code).
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Since the wording of the subpoena order stated defendant was to be
"served directly", defendant contended personal service was required.
The court rejected this argument stating, "Service of process is a statutory
matter; and, if the order is ambiguous, the statutory language should be
looked to as an interpretative guide. Section 1783(b) requires only that
service be made in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
'relating to service of process on a person in a foreign country.' " Among
the five alternative methods of service provided by F.R.C.P. 4(i), is the
method prescribed by the law of the foreign country. Since the service of
process satisfied the requirements of Italian law, as well as the strictures
imposed by due process, the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §1783(b) and
F.R.C.P. 4(i) had been met.
Defendant also argued that the identity of the person tendering travel
and attendance fees affected his substantive rights, and that he was
denied due process of law by the refusal of the court to grant an evidentiary hearing. Both arguments were dismissed by the court as being
without merit.
Defendant's conviction was affirmed.

SALVAGE
Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 408 F.Supp. 907
(S.D. Fla. 1976).
Plaintiff brought an action for possession and confirmation of title
against all persons to a ship wreck found on the continental shelf outside
the territorial waters of the United States. The vessel was believed to be
the "Nuestra Senora de Atocha" which sank in a hurricane in 1622. The
United States Government answered and countered-claimed seeking title
to the vessel under the Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§432, 433, and the
Abandoned Property Act, 40 U.S.C. §310.
The United States claimed that, under the concept of sovereign
perogative, objects of antiquity found by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States are taken in the name of the sovereign and
become the property of the people. Under the American rule on sovereign perogative, the United States must manifest a specific intent to
appropriate derelict property. The court found no such express or implied
specific intent in the present case.
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The present case is distinguishable from the cases where Civil War
wrecks "ought to come to the United States" as contemplated by 40 U.S.C.
§310. Civil War wrecks are the product of internal strife of the United
States and such strong contacts imply a specific intent to appropriate
derelict property. The instant case involves a wreck which sunk almost
150 years before the United States was created.
The court also rejected the Government's contention that the wreck's
location on the outer continental shelf of the United States conferred jurisdiction over the wreck. The Antiquities Act applies to objects "situate on
land owned or controlled by the Government of the United States." The
Abandoned Property Act embraces property "within the jurisdiction of
the United States." The court, referring to Article 2 of the Convention
on the Continental Shelf (U. N. Doe. A/Conf. 13/L.55), held the
Unitetd States only had jurisdiction over the natural resources on or
below the continental shelf and no sovereign rights existed other than
those necessary for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the shelf's
natural resources. The court noted that if 43 U.S.C. §1332 (the enacting
statute for the Continental Shelf Convention) conferred jurisdiction over
the wreck, then the Continental Shelf Convention would nullify the
statute's jurisdictional effect on the facts in this case. Extending sovereignty beyond the contemplation of the Continental Shelf Convention
would undoubtedly provoke international controversy.
Finally, the court rejected the Government's argument that the
United States has jurisdiction to restrict the activities of its citizens
even though they may be conducted extraterritorily. The court found
the concept true but inapplicable to the present case for the following
reasons: 1) the wreck was not found on the land of or within the jurisdiction of the United States as required by the Antiquities Act and the
Abandoned Property Act; 2) supplemental regulations to the Antiquities
Act indicate the word "lands" is used in a narrow sense and does not
include the outer continental shelf; and 3) the Antiquities Act has been
held unconstitutionally vague when used to restrict personal activities
under penalty of criminal sanctions.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
Vincente v. State ol Trinidad, 83 Misc. 2d 101, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 369 (1975)
This opinion deals with a pre-trial hearing on defendant's motion to
dismiss. The case involved an action for damages arising out of the
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allegedly negligent medical treatment sustained in a hospital owned, operated, and controlled by the defendant, the State of Trinidad and
Tobago. Defendant contended that the court lacked jurisdiction over it on
the grounds that service of process was insufficient and that defendant
was immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The court held that service was proper because the methods plaintiffs employed were reasonably calculated to give adequate notice to
defendant in compliance with the test set forth by the Supreme Court in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 306 (1950).
Service was of two types: by mail to the Attorney General of Trinidad
and Tobago; and by personal service on its diplomatic assent to the
United Nations, and service upon three corporate agents, owned and
operated by defendant, located in and doing business in New York.
In denying the State of Trinidad and Tobago's motion to dismiss on
the basis of sovereign immunity, the court explained that the State Department has modified the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity,
adopting a policy which tests each claim for sovereign immunity according to whether the gravamen of the claim rose out of "commercial ventures outside the traditional area of governmental functions; through
corporate or separate entities through which the Sovereign acts." If such
a venture is involved, then sovereign immunity will not be granted.
The court respected the Department of State's suggestion that sovereign immunity be denied defendants in the present case. The court followed the rule that an executive suggestion that immunity be granted
or denied is conclusive upon the courts on the ground that a foreign
claim of sovereign immunity is essentially a political question.

